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The  expansion  in the  bank  consolidation  movement 
that  began  in  the  1960’s  and  gained  speed  in  the 
early  1970’s  raised  concern  over  possible  over-con- 
centration  in banking  markets.  Have  these  fears  been 
realized  ?  This  article  will  seek  a  partial  answer  to 
this  question  by  examining  changes  in  concentration 
that  have  occurred  since  1970  within  selected  Fifth 
District  metropolitan  areas.l 
Court  decisions  and  regulatory  rulings  on  bank 
mergers  and  bank  holding  company  acquisitions  have 
relied  heavily  on  measures  of  bank  concentration. 
These  measures  have  been  employed  as  indicators  of 
potential  anti-competitive  effects  of  proposed  bank 
consolidations.”  Salley,  however,  cautions  against 
the  simpIis:ic  acceptance  of  concentration  ratios  as  a 
quantitative  measure  of  anti-competitive  effects  : 
“The  concentration  ratio  can  only  suggest  that  the 
fewness  of  large  firms  makes  restrictive  pricing  and 
output  decisions  more  possible  than  if  there  were 
many  firms  of  equal  size.  It  does  not  mean  that  the 
large  firms  are  actually  engaging  in  anti-competitive 
conduct”  [ 10, p.  W]. 
Empirical  investigations  into  the  Relationship  be- 
tween  concentration  and  prices  in  banking  markets 
have  produced  conflicting  results.  Though  most 
studies  generally  show  that  higher  concentration  is 
associated  with  higher  prices  and  a  deterioration  in 
other  performance  variabfes,  the  effect  is  small  [e.g., 
6,f,  8,  121.  Relatively  large  changes  in concentration 
are  associated  with  relatively  small  changes  in  per- 
formance.  Xo  such  relationship,  however,  was  found 
1 Onlr  urban  markets  were  considered in  this  article  since  the  dual 
purpose  of  banking  regulation  tends  to  confine  the  potential  useful- 
ness  of  concentration  ratios  to  the  larger  banking  markets  ClOj. 
The  use of  Standard  Metropolitan  Statistical  Areas  (SMSAs)  should 
not  be  interpreted  as  meaning  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Rich- 
mond  or the  Federal  Reserve  System  has  determined that  the  SMSA 
delineation  best  approximates  the  banking  markets  included  in  the 
study. 
*Two  landmark  cases are  U.  S.  v.  Philadelphia National  Bank,  et  al 
(1962)  and  U.  S.  v.  The  Phillipsburg  National  Bank  and  Trust  Co. 
(1969).  In  the  latter  case.  the  Supreme  Court  ruled  that  concen- 
tration  ratios  were the  only  wag  by  which the probable anti-competi- 
tive  effects  of  a  proposal  could be  ascertained,  and  without  concen- 
tration  ratios,  no  statistically  reliable  probability  of  lessening  of 
competition  could  be  determined.  This  reasoning  has  come  under 
heavy criticism,  for  example  [I,  2.  113. 
in  a  recent  srcdy  in  Texas  [3].  These  opposing 
results  may  be partially  explained  by  sampling  differ- 
ences  and  meacrrrement  problems.  One  problem,  for 
example,  is  the  difficulty  of  defining  product  and 
geographic  bank  markets.  Because  of  such  limita- 
tions,  no  attermpt  will  be  made  in  this  article  to  draw 
conclusions  about  changes  in competition  on the  basis 
of  changes  in  statistical  measures  of  concentration. 
The  article  proceeds  as  follows.  The  first  section 
introduces  and  briefly  describes  the  measures  of  con- 
centration  included  in  the  analysis.  The  second  sec- 
tion  appIies  ti:ese  measures  to  selected  Fifth  District 
markets  and  szzmlarizes  the  results. 
Measuring  Static  Market  Concentration  Studies 
of  market  stricture  have  frequently  focused  upon 
static  measures  zhat  deal  with  the  domination  of  a 
few  firms  at  i: single  point  in  time.  The  three-bank 
concentration  ratio,  for  one,  determines  the  percent- 
age  of total  deposits  in  a  market  held  in  aggregate  by 
the  three  larges:  banks.  It  may  be  computed  by  the 
3 
formula  CR  =  2  Sj.  Here  CR  is the  concentration 
i=l 
ratio,  Si  is  the  P  bank’s  share  (percent  of  total)  of 
market  deposits,  2  is  the  summation  operator,  and 
i  is  the  summation  index  representing  each  of  the 
three  largest  fir:zs.  In  words,  the  formula  states  that 
the  concentration  ratio  is  the  sum  of  the  deposit 
shares  of  the  three  largest  banks.  Note  that  this 
measure  places  total  importance  on  the  largest  banks 
by  implying  that  they  are  the  only  relevant  firms  to 
consider  when  gauging  the  degree  of monopoly  power 
that  exists  in a  market.  The  concentration  ratio  does 
not  distinguish  between  alternative  distributions  or 
mixes  of  market  shares  between  even  these  largest 
banks.  The  same  result  would  be  derived  from 
markets  A  or  B  if  the  three  largest  banks  in  each 
controlled  55,  ZC, 10 and  25,  25,  25  percent,  respec- 
tively.  Each  market  would  have  a  three-bank  con- 
centration  ratio  of  75,  yet  the  implications  for  mo- 
nopoly  power  would  be  quite  different  in  the  two 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RlCHMOND  9 markets.  Note  also  that  the  concentration  ratio  takes 
no  account  of  the  number  of  firms  in  a  market  or 
the  distribution  of  the  remaining  shares  among  small 
firms. 
A  better  measure  of  static  market  structure  would 
consider  both  the  total  number  of  firms  in  a  market 
and  the  variation  among  the  sizes  of  firms,  two  struc- 
tural  features  that  bear  on  the  ability  of  the  larger 
firms  to increase  price  with  a minimum  loss  in market 
share.  The  Herfindahl  Index  (HI)  incorporates 
these  features.  It  may  be  defined  as  HI  =  i  Sis 
i=l 
where  n  is  the  number  of  banks  represented  in  the 
market  and  Si is the  ith firm’s  market  share  expressed 
as a percent  of  total  deposits3  In  words,  the  formula 
states  that  the  Herfindahl  Index  is  the  sum  of  the 
squares  of  the  deposit  shares  of  all  banks  in  the 
market.  Since  each  market  share  is  squared  prior  to 
summation,  relatively  greater  weight  is given  to  banks 
with  larger  market  shares.  This  seems  reasonable 
since  it is these  firms  that  presumably  have  the  power 
to  alter  short-run  prices.  Any  switch  in  market 
shares  from  one  firm  to  a larger  firm  will  result  in  a 
larger  value  in  the  Herfindahl  Index.  Sjmilarly, 
following  a  loss  in  market  share  by  one  bank  to  a 
smaller  bank,  the  Herfindahl  will  fall.  This  measure 
can  assume  values  between  zero  (indicating  an  in- 
finite  number  of  firms  in  the  market)  and  one  (indi- 
cating  only  one  firm  present). 
Measuring  Dynamic  Market  Concentration  In 
judging  the  intensity  of competition  in a market,  some 
measure  of  the  ability  of  leading  firms  to  maintain 
their  relative  market  position  over  time  may  be  more 
significant  than  is  the  extent  of  concentration  at  a 
particular  point  in  time  [4].  Consequently,  a  com- 
plete  description  of  a  market  not  only  should  include 
its  current  status  but  also  an  indication  of  how  its 
structure  has  changed  over  time.  Measures  of  change 
in  market  concentration  can  provide  important  infor- 
mation  on  market  structure.  Previous  studies  have 
relied  on  the  Dynamic  Herfindahl  Index,  the  Dy- 
namic  Concentration  Ratio,  and/or  the  Share  Sta- 
bility  Index  for  information  concerning  the  changing 
structure  of  individual  banking  markets  [3,  5,  lo]. 
These  measures  were  also  applied  to  the  metropolitan 
areas  included  in  this  article. 
The  Dynamic  Herfindahl  Index  (DHI)  is  simply 
3An  atternative  definition  of  the  Herfindahl  Index  is: 
HI  =  1  x.2  +  $ 
i=,  i 
where  n  is  the  number  of  firms  in  the  market  and  xi  is  the  devi- 
ation  of  the  ith  firm’s  market  share  from  the  average  share 
(xi=  si-sl.  The  index  increases.  then.  with  either  greater 
variation  in  the  sizes  of  the  firms  or  with  a  smaller  number  of 
firms. 
the  change  in  the  value  of  the  Herfindahl  Index  be,- 
tween  years  as  measured  by  the  difference  between 
the  end-  and  beginning-year  index  numbers,  i.e,, 
DHI  =  HIisis  -  HInm,.  It  indicates  the  change  in 
concentration  or  degree  of inequality  of firms’  market 
shares.  Since  the  Herfindahl  gives  greatest  weight  to 
the  larger  firms,  the  DHI  gives  an  indication  of 
whether  the  market  power  of  the  largest  firms  in- 
creased  or  decreased  over  the  intervening  years.  Th.e 
DHI  can  be  either  positive  or  negative.  If  positive, 
it  suggests  the  largest  firms  have  increased  their  rela- 
tive  strength  in  the  market  since  the  base  year.  If 
negative,  on  the  other  hand,  the  degree  of  inequality 
among  market  shares  has  declined. 
The  Dynamic  Concentration  Index  (DCI)  mel- 
sures  the  statistical  relationship  between  the  1970 
market  share  of each  bank  and  its  1976 share  through 
simple  regression  analysis.  Specifically,  the  DC1  is 
defined  as  the  geometric  nzean  of  (1)  the  regression 
of  1976  market  shares  on  1970  shares  and  (2)  tlhe 
reciprocal  of  the  regression  of  1970  on  1976  shares4 
The  DCI  attains  relevance  when  its  computed  value 
is  compared  with  a  norm  or  standard  of  unity.  A 
value  of  1.0 means  that  the  relative  sizes  of  the  firms 
in  a  market  are  the  same  as  in  the  base  year,  indi- 
cating  that  no  change  in  concentration  has  occurred. 
A  DC1  greater  than  one  indicates  the  larger  firms 
have  grown  faster  than  (or,  at  the  expense  of)  t.he 
smaller  firms  and,  therefore,  that  concentration  has 
increased.  Conversely,  a  DC1  less  than  one  signifies 
that  concentration  has  decreased  since  the  largest 
banks  have  grown  at  a  slower  pace  than  the  smaller 
banks.  A  DC1  value  below  unity  indicates  that,  on 
average,  the  larger  firms  in  the  base  year  were  not 
able  to  maintain  their  market  shares  and  suggests  a 
lack  of  monopoly  power  in  a  market  [5]. 
Another  measure  of  change  in  market  structure  is 
the  Share  Stability  Index  (SSI).  It  is  the  sim.ple 
correlation  coefficient  between  market  shares  for  each 
firm  in  the  two  years  and,  therefore,  indicates  the 
degree  to  which  the  market  share  of each  firm  in  1976 
is  determined  by  its  1970  share.  The  SSI  has  been 
used  as  a  measure  of  the  stability  of  market  shares 
and,  indirectly,  as  a  measure  of  the  intensity  of  com- 
petition  in  each  market  [3].  The  assumption  is ,that 
the  greater  the  competition  between  firms  in  a  mar- 
ket,  the  more  susceptible  will  each  firm  be  to  vari- 
ations  in  market  share.  Conversely,  the  less  stable 
4 The  DC1  is  the  geometric  mean  of  the  regression  coefficients,  bl 
and  bz.  where  61 =  \‘xy/Xx’,  bz =  Xy:/Xxy,  I  is  the  deviation  of 
the  firm’s  market  share  from  the  average  share  in  1970,  and  y  is 
the  deviation  from  the  average  share  in  1976.  The  DCI,  therefore. 
is  the  square  root  of  the  product  of  the  regression  coefficients.  i.e., 
DC1  =  m  As  discussed in  Prais  [ 91.  it  is  necessary  to  follow 
this  procedure  to  obtain  an  unambiguous  estimate  of  the  direction 
of  change  in  market  concentration. 
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greater  the  presumed  degree  of  competition  in  a 
market.  A  SSI  equal  to  one  indicates  no  change  in 
market  shares,  while  a  SSI  equal  to  zero  indicates 
no  relationship  at  all between  firms’  market  shares  in 
1970 and  1976. 
Changes  in  Fifth  District  Metropolitan  Areas 
The  preceding  section  defined  and  explained  the  logic 
of  alternative  measures  of  market  concentration.  The 
next  step  is to  apply  the  measures  to  1970  and  1976 
bank  deposit  data.  Before  this  could  be  done,  how- 
ever,  it  was  necessary  to  make  certain  adjustments 
for  bank  entry,  mergers,  and  holding  company  ac- 
quisitions.  The  adjustments  were  as  follows:  a  new 
bank  entering  the  market  between  1970  and  1976 
was  treated  as if it  had  existed  in  the  market  in  1970 
with  a  market  share  of  zero.  Similarly,  a  bank 
merged  or  acquired  by  another  banking  organization 
already  in  the  market  was  treated  as  if  it  remained 
in  the  market  in  1976  with  a  zero  market  share.  A 
bank  acquired  by  an  outside  firm,  i.e.,  one  not  in  the 
market,  was  simply  replaced  by  that  firm.  Market 
shares  were  calculated  by banking  organization  rather 
than  by  individual  bank.  Shares  of  affiliated  banks, 
therefore,  were  combined  under  the  control  of  the 
parent  holding  company.  Since  adjustments  were 
made  in the  geographic  boundaries  of  SMSAs  during 
the  interim,  market  shares  for  both  years  were  calcu- 
lated  using  1976  SMSA  definitions. 
According  to  the  accompanying  table,  most  of  the 
largest  SMSAs  in the  Fifth  Federal  Reserve  District 
esperienced  declines  in  concentration  between 
and  1976.  table  shows  Dynamic  Herfindahl 
declined  in  of the  areas  examined. 
the  Charlotte-Gastonia  Baltimore  SMSAs 
hibited  slight  in  this  of  concen- 
The  largest  declines  occurred  the 
three  Carolina  SMSAs;  Greensboro-Win- 
ston-Salem-High  ;  and  Charleston,  West 
with  the  and  Greenville-Spartanburg 
sharply  from  low  concentration 
in  1970.  Washington  SMSA,  nearly 
twice  total  deposits  banking  organizations 
the  next  market,  displayed  least  con- 
in both  The  percentage  in 
concentration  the  nation’s  over  tlie 
was  considerable.  Charlotte-Gastonia  and 
noke  metropolitan  had  the  Herfindahl 
Indexes  1976. 
SMSAl 
Charleston-North  Charleston,  S. C. 
Greenville-Spartanburg,  S.  C. 
Columbia,  S. C. 
Greensboro-Winston-Salem- 
High  Point,  N.  C. 
Raleigh-Durham,  N.  C. 
Charlotte-Gastonia,  N.  C. 
Newport  News-Hampton,  Va. 
Norfolk-Virginia  Beach- 
Portsmouth,  Va.-N  .C. 
Richmond,  Va. 
Roanoke,  Va. 
Charleston,  W.  Va. 
Baltimore,  Md. 
Washington,  0.  C.-Md.-Va. 
DYNAMIC  MEASURES  OF  MARKET  STRUCTURE 
Herfindahf  index  Dynamic  Dynamic  Share 
Herfindahl  Concentration 
Index* 
Stability 
Index3  index 
-0.0385  0.8746  0.9862 
-0.0399  0.7837  0.9727 
-0.0533  0.7686  0.9645 
1970 
0.2546  0.2161 
0.1590  0.1191 
0.2071  0.1538 
0.2820  0.2290  -0.0530  0.8864  0.9957 
0.1919  0.1729  -0.0190  0.9278  0.9879 
0.2385  0.2458  0.0073  1.0189  0.9754 
0.1633  0.1628  -0.0005  0.9974  0.9795 
0.2266  0.2004  -0.0262  0.9204  0.9858 
0.1889  0.1751  -0.0138  0.9509  0.9892 
0.2418  0.2376  -0.0042  0.9880  0.9778 
0.1547  0.1168  -0.0379  0.8118  0.9804 
0.1649  0.1783  0.0134  1.0464  0.9846 
0.0812  0.0686  -0.0126  0.9029  0.9853 
1976 
* 1976  SMSA  definitions  formed  the  basis  for  calculation  of  market  shares  in  both  1970  and  1976.  For  areas  included  within  SMSAs,  see 
Fifth  District  Figures,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Richmond,  1976,  9.  109. 
* Negative  values  indicate  decreases  in  concentration. 
‘Values  less  than  1.0  indicate  decreases  in  concentration. 
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more  also  exhibited  Dynamic  Concentration  Indexes 
below  1.0,  indicating  that,  on  average,  the  largest 
firms  have  lost  influence  or  dominance  in  their  re- 
spective  markets  since  1970.  Both  the  DC1  and  the 
DHI  identified  the  same  SMS,4s  as  experiencing  the 
greatest  reduction  in  concentration.  The  Columbia, 
S.  C.  SMSA  again  had  the  greatest  reduction,  as 
measured  by  the  DCI,  with  a  value  of  .7686.  This 
index  reveals  that  the  larger-than-average  sized  banks 
in  the  Columbia  SMSA  lost,  on  average,  approxi- 
mateiy  23  percent  of  their  respective  market  shares 
between  1970  and  1976.  Only  slightly  smaller  losses 
were  experienced  by  the  large  banks  in  Greenville- 
Spartanburg,  %&R6harlestons,  and  Greensboro- 
Slrinston-Salem-Hig~?&&@.$Ihe  larger-than-aver- 
age  banks  in  Charlotte-Gastor’&  and  Baltimore,  on 
the  other  hand,  increased  their  market  shares  an 
average  of  1.89  and  4.64  percent,  respectively. 
The  Share  Stability  Index  for  each  market  shows 
a  strong  relationship  between  market  shares  across 
years.  Since  the  SSI  was  only  slightly  lower  than 
1.0 for  all  markets,  market  shares  appear  to  be  very 
stable  and,  though  movin, c  in  favor  of  smaller  banks 
in  the  aggregate,  have  not  been  subject  to  wide  vari- 
ations.  The  combination  of high  SSIs  and  low  DCIs 
suggests  that  the  larger-than-average  banks  lost 
market  shares  as  a  group  primarily  to  small  or  new 
banks  in the  market  rather  than  to other  large  banks5 
This  clearly  was  the  case  in  the  South  Carolina 
markets  ;  in  Greensboro-J’i’inston-Salem-High 
Point  and  in  Charleston,  &Test  Virginia.  In  the 
remaining  markets  that  esperienced  declines  in  con- 
centration,  the  largest  banks  appear  to  have  lost 
market  shares  both  to  other  large  banks  and  to  small 
banks. 
Evidence  of  decreasing  concentration  in  the  ma- 
jority  of  markets  does  not  necessarily  mean  lower 
prices  or  an  improvement  in  service  to  bank  cus- 
tomers.  Similarly,  though  the  DHI  and  DC1  may 
indicate  changes  in  monopoly  power  in  the  Charlotte- 
Gastonia  and  Baltimore  SMSAs,  higher  prices  and  a 
deterioration  in  customer  service  is  not  necessarily 
implied. 
Summary  Courts  and  regulatory  agencies  have 
been  concerned  that  bank  consolidations  might  in- 
crease  market  concentration  and  erode  competition 
within  individual  markets.  ft  does  not  appear,  how- 
ever,  that  concentration  has  increased  in  Fifth  Dis- 
trict  metropolitan  markets.  In  fact,  concentration 
GFor  a  mathematical  presentation  of  the  implications  from  combi- 
nations  of  different  measures  of  dm8mic  concentration.  see  IS]. 
measures  reported  here  indicate  that  11  of  the  13 
SlMSAs  examined  actually  experienced  declines  iin 
concentration  over  the  1970-1976  period.  On  the 
basis  of  these  findings,  it  is  safe  to  conclude  that  the 
pattern  of  proposed  acquisitions  and  mergers  ap 
proved  by  the  Federal  banking  agencies  since  1970, 
in  general,  has  not  resulted  in  increasing  concen- 
tration  in  the  District’s  major  urban  markets. 
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